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Abstract
In a 2-country monetary union, this paper studies a Stackelberg game be-
tween the Central Banker and two symmetrical countries. The central banker
chooses the money supply. In each country, there is a union who acts as a
monopoly of labor supply. Firms are wage and price takers. We analyze the
effects of internationally coordinated unions versus internationally uncoor-
dinated unions. It is shown that wages are lower when unions are interna-
tionally coordinated and the money policy is more accomodating. This result
is linked to the degree of conservatism of the Central Banker with respect to
inflation.1
JEL Classification: E24, E5, J51, P45.
Key Words: Monetary Union, International Union Coodination, Employment
and Wage-Setting
1Suggestions and remarks from Christopher Crowe, Shelton Nicholls and Delisle Worrell were
very useful when writing this paper. All remaining errors are ours.
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1 Introduction
In a 2-country monetary union where the Central Banker chooses the money sup-
ply, we analyze the impact of his choice on employment when unions are inter-
nationally coordinated or internationally uncoordinated.
This is an important question to study because national unions are trying to
organize a European unions’ coordination, but until now, they still do not have
any effective bargaining power at the monetary union level. The international-
ization of all European Economic Union unions (EEU unions) has not been fully
accomplished yet. For example, there haven’t been any European strikes so far.
The objective of this paper is to analyze what could happen if unions became
successful in their internationalization process and got some effective collective
bargaining power. This is not a trivial question, especially in a monetary union,
such as the EEU, where monetary policy choices are imposed on all members of
the union, whatever their specific economic constraints are, Canzoneri and Hen-
derson (1991) and Jensen (1993) and Agiomirgianakis (1998). Countries differ in
many aspects, but the monetary policy is unique for each one. Countries’own
level of unemployment differ, but in general European unemployment is high
and may be linked to monetary decisions.
From a theoretical point of view, in our paper, countries trade national goods
for foreign goods so that they differ in their consumer price index. In an inter-
national environment, this is sufficient to generate country differences in both
prices and wages, consequently unemployment rates differ across countries. De-
pendng on his degree of conservatism in term of inflation, the Central Banker
chooses the quantity of money in the monetary union, whereas trade union — as
a monopoly of labor supply — imposes on firm a workers’ welfare-maximizing
wage. Different wages across countries involve different unemployment rates
across countries. Since wages affect price level, and prices affect the monetary
mass, the optimal choice of the Central Banker depends on wether unions are co-
ordinated or not at the international level. To our knowledge, this question has
not been addressed.
The literature on the impact of monetary union on the labour market is char-
acterized by unions’ wage-setting at the national level. At the national level, Ak-
hand (1992) demonstrated that trade unions coordination solves partially the in-
flationary bias problem. In the EMU literature, Soskice and Iversen (1998) pay
attention to the interaction between central bank monetary rules and systems of
national collective wage bargaining. They analyze coordinated wage-bargaining
systems at the national level since wage determination is dominated by collective
bargaining in all the EMU member states. They discuss the possibility of govern-
ment union bargains. Cukierman and Lippi (1999) extend Gruner and Hefeker
(1999) to the case of a multi-union country which switches from a national mon-
etary policy to a union monetary policy. Considering decentralized multi-union
wage-setting at national level leads to changes in real variables even if unions are
not inflation averse.
One notable difference from these authors is that in our framework we do not
analyze the switch from a national to a monetary union, because this has already
been done in 2002 for EEU. We only consider one union in each of the two coun-
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tries and study the impact of their coordination, or not, at the international level.
In other words, the centralization takes place at the international level, and not
at the national one, as usually done in the literature. This is new. We show that
international coordination between unions in a monetary union yields to lower
wages and a higher employment level compared with uncoordinated unions. In-
ternationally coordinated unions leads to an accommodating monetary policy as
long as the Central Banker is sufficiently conservative in terms of inflation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 is
devoted to the resolution of the model. Section 4 analyzes the effects of unions’
coordination. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a competitive world of two equal-sized, interdependent and sym-
metrical countries under certainty. Each country produces an internationaly trad-
able homogeneous good. In the remainder of the paper, subscript i (j) denote
domestic (foreign) variables. The unique Central Banker is the leader of Stackel-
berg who plays against the two countries. He plays the first by determining the
amount of nominal money, m, which minimizes a loss function Ψ. In each coun-
try, the union represents a labor supply monopoly which imposes the wage rate
wi on the firm. This wage maximizes the utility U of all members of the union.
The firm maximizes its profits with respect to the labor demand, `i, taking the
union’s wage level as given. The Stackelberg game is the following:
min
m(wi,`i,wj ,`j)
Ψ(m(wi, `i, wj, `j)),{
wi
? = argmaxwiU(wi(m)),
`i
? = argmax`iΠ(`i(wi(m))),
{
wj
? = argmaxwjU(wj(m)),
`j
? = argmax`jΠ(`j(wj(m))).
We solve this static Stackelberg game backwards. Consequently, we first present
the firms, then the unions before presenting the central bank’s behavior.
2.1 The Firms’ behavior
In each country, there is a representative firm, which is a price-taker. Capital is al-
ready fixed, so that output Y is produced with labor L according to the following
production functions:
Yi = L
α
i , Yj = L
α
j , (1)
where 0 < α < 1 is the elasticity of output with respect to labour. Firms are profit
maximizers for a given wage W and a given price P . They max
L
{Π = Lα −WL}.
Approximating the production function in a neighborhood of any given value Y0
and L0, we have:
Y − Y0
Y0
Y0 = αL
α−1
0
L− L0
L0
L0.
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Defining y = (Y − Y0)/Y0 and ` = (L− L0)/L0, we have:
yY0 = αL
α−1
0 `L0,
yY0 = αL
α
0 `.
Using (1) after simplification by Y0, we have:
yi = α`i, and yj = α`j. (2)
2.2 Unions’ behavior
Two types of unions’behavior are possible: union are uncoordinated or coordi-
nated.
2.2.1 Uncoordinated unions and wage setting
Unions’ behavior is given by the maximization of a loss function of employment
`k, k = i, j and real wages wˆk, k = i, j. In line with Driffill (1986), Jensen
(1993), Zervoyianni (1996), Agiomirgianakis (1998) the domestic union (country
i) maximizes with respect to national wages the utility of their members subject
to the fact that it does not take into account the impact of his decision on foreign
wage, as well as on money supply:
max
wk
Uk = −(`k − `0k)2 + bwˆk(m), b > 0, (3)
s.c. ∂wk
∂w−k
= ∂m
∂w−k
= 0,
where `0k is the labor force of country k, and index−k captures the other country.
Unions choose wages taking money and foreign wage as given.
We now present the case of coordinated unions.
2.2.2 Coordinated unions and wage setting
We now turn to the coordinated trade unions. Unions maximize the joined utility
of their members without taking into account the impact of their wage decision
on the money supply. The maximization program is:
max
wi,wj
Ui + Uj =
[
− (`i − `0i)2 + bwi
]
+
[
−
(
`j − `0j
)2
+ bwj
]
, (4)
s.c.
∂m
∂wi
=
∂m
∂wj
= 0.
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2.3 The Central banker’s policy
In a monetary union, the central bank maximizes a function of the joined utilities
of the two countries. The loss function, which is the sum of two national loss func-
tions, depends on the employment in the two countries as well as the consumer
price index in the two countries. The Central Banker chooses the money supply
in order to minimize
min
m
Ψ = Vi + Vj = (`i − `0i)2 + λq2i +
(
`j + `0j
)2
+ λq2j , (5)
s.t.
∂wi
∂m
=
∂wj
∂m
= 0.
where λ captures the relative weight of price into the loss function of the Central
Bank. If the Central Bank is a vigorous inflation fighter, λ takes a high value. On
the opposite, if λ ∼ 0, the Central Bank pays more attention to employment than
to prices.
Before solving this static Stackelberg game, we present some useful prelimi-
nary price equations which help determine the solution of the game.
2.4 Prices
As national and foreign productions are internationaly tradable, they are con-
sumed in both countries. This implies that consumer price indexes qi and qj de-
pend on national and foreign prices. The relative price of foreign good measured
in national good noted z, is simply the difference between the production prices,
where pi, pj are approximated prices (See Appendix A.1 for more details):
z = pj − pi. (6)
Then we can derive the following relations:
qi = pi + βz, qj = pj − βz, (7)
where β captures the preference for foreign good in the domestic country. We
assume that national consumers prefer national good, so that 0 < β < 0, 5. This is
a usual assumption in this literature, see for example Lane (2000), Schwarz (2004),
Agiomirgianakis (1998).
Real wages, which will be defined below, are increasing in nominal wages, wi and
wj , and decreasing in consumer price, qi and qj . We have:
wˆi = wi − qi, wˆj = wj − qj. (8)
We assume that the money supply is a linear convex combination of the national
and the foreign prices augmented by the national and foreign outputs. Then, the
money supply is given by :
m = [vpi + (1− v) pj] + [yi + yj] , (9)
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where v represents the domestic production’s share. In line with Lane (2000) and
Agiomirgianakis (1998), we choose from now up to the end α = 1−α = 0, 5. Uni-
fied market is equally shared between domestic and foreign productions. Trade
balances are given by:
bi = −bj = θz − β (yi − yj) , (10)
where θ captures the share of the relative prices in the external equilibrium. Ex-
ternal equilibrium is reached if yi − yj = δz :
yi − yj = θ
β
(pi − pj) ≡ δ (pi − pj) , δ > 1, (11)
δ is assumed to be higher than unity because changes in money purchasing power
has stronger effects on trade balance than changes in incomes.
3 Resolution of the model
The model is solved backward. We start with the solution of the firms, then the
solution of the monopoly unions. Knowing the equilibrium activity in each coun-
try (commodity market equilibrium and labor market equilibrium), the Central
Banker determines the amount of money for the monetary union.
3.1 Firms
Labour demand is a decreasing function in the real wage W/P :
Li =
[
αPi
Wi
] 1
1−α
, Lj =
[
αPj
Wj
] 1
1−α
. (12)
By an appropriate approximation, see appendix (A.1), these functions can be
rewritten as:
`i = −
[
wi − pi
1− α
]
, `j = −
[
wj − pj
1− α
]
. (13)
As shown in Appendix A.1, the difference between the wage increase wi and the
price increase pi captures the increase in the real purchasing power of consumers.
Since, by definition, `i represents a variation of the labor demand, equation (8)
means that an increase in the real purchasing power of consumers leads to a de-
crease in the variation of labor demand.
3.2 Unions’ solution
This subsection is devoted to the unions’solution in both uncoordinated unions
and coordinated unions.
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3.2.1 Uncoordinated unions
The resolution, of (3) gives :
wi = m+
φ
σ
(m− wj)− τ
σ
`0i + η, wj = m+
φ
σ
(m− wi)− τ
σ
`0j + η, (14)
where
σ = α + 2δ > 0, η = bτ
2σ2
[(1− α)σ + 2βα(1 + α)] > 0,
φ = α(1− 2δ) < 0, τ = 2(1 + α)(α + δ(1− α)) > 0.
The relations (14) summarize the Nash reaction functions. Both nominal wages
are negatively correlated to labour force. As expected, an accommodating mon-
etary policy lead to higher wages. Substituting the first equation of (14) into the
second equation of (14) yields :
wi = m+
φτ
σ2 − φ2 `0j −
στ
σ2 − φ2 `0i +
σ − φ
σ
η. (15)
Consequently
wj = m+
φτ
σ2 − φ2 `0i −
στ
σ2 − φ2 `0j +
σ − φ
σ
η. (16)
In this case unions set wi and wj together.
3.2.2 Coordinated unions
Coordinated unions’ solutions are given by:
wi = m−
τ
(
φ`0i + σ`0j
)
(σ + θ)2
− τ (σ
2 + φ2)
(σ − φ) (σ + φ)2
(
`0i − `0j
)
+
b
2
(1− α) (1 + α) ,
wj = m−
τ
(
φ`0j + σ`0i
)
(σ + φ)2
+
τ (σ2 + φ2)
(σ − φ) (σ + φ)2
(
`0i − `0j
)
+
b
2
(1− α) (1 + α) . (17)
3.2.3 The Central Banker’s solution
The central bank’s reaction function is given by :
m =
1− 2λ(1− α)α
2 + 2λ(1− α)2 (wi + wj) +
1 + α
2 + 2λ(1− α)2 (`0i + `0j) (18)
Note that, if λ is zero, then the policy-maker wants to promote employment what-
ever the inflation costs, and money supply are:
m =
1
2
(wi + wj) +
1 + α
2
(`0i + `0j). (19)
In this case, nominal wages have a positive effect on money supply. When country
unions are very strong, the central banker chooses an an accommodating mone-
tary policy to avoid a rise in unemployment and to maintain a high level of labour
demand.
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3.3 Equilibrium
This Subsection is devoted to the computation of all equilibria over all markets,
knowing the optimal wages, the optimal labor demands and the optimal money
obtained in the previous Section.
Equations (2), (11), and (14) have been used to obtain relation (20) :
pj − pi = α
α + δ(1− α)(wj − wi). (20)
Note that pj − pi is positively related to the wage differential. From (2), (9), (14),
and (20), we can derive (21):
m =
1 + α
1− αpi +
1 + α
1− α
( −α
2 (α + δ(1− α))
)
(wi − wj)− α
1− α (wi + wj) . (21)
The solution for pi and pj can be written as:
pi =
1− α
1 + α
m+
α
2 (α + δ (1− α)) (wi − wj) +
α
1 + α
(wi + wj) ,
pj =
1− α
1 + α
m− α
2 (α + δ (1− α)) (wi − wj) +
α
1 + α
(wi + wj) . (22)
Using (6) (7), (22) we determine the consumer price :
qi =
1− α
1 + α
m+
α
1 + α
(wi + wj) + (1− 2β) α
2(α + δ(1− α))(wi − wj),
qj =
1− α
1 + α
m+
α
1 + α
(wi + wj)− (1− 2β) α
2(α + δ(1− α))(wi − wj). (23)
From (23) and (8), it follows immediately that wˆi and wˆj are related to m, wi and
wj according to :
wˆi = wi − 1− α
1 + α
m− α
1 + α
(wi + wj)− (1− 2β) α
2(α + δ(1− α))(wi − wj),
wˆj = wj − 1− α
1 + α
m− α
1 + α
(wi + wj) + (1− 2β) α
2(α + δ(1− α))(wi − wj). (24)
Substituting (22) into (14), we get :
`i =
1
1 + α
m− 1
1− α
[
wi − α
2 (α + δ (1− α)) (wi − wj)−
α
1 + α
(wi + wj)
]
,
`j =
1
1 + α
m− 1
1− α
[
wj +
α
2 (α + δ (1− α)) (wi − wj)−
α
1 + α
(wi + wj)
]
. (25)
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Using (25, (14), (2) we can express the outputs yi, yj as:
yi =
α
1 + α
m− α
1− α
[
wi − α
2 (α + δ (1− α)) (wi − wj)−
α
1 + α
(wi + wj)
]
,
yj =
α
1 + α
m− α
1− α
[
wi +
α
2 (α + δ (1− α)) (wi − wj)−
α
1 + α
(wi + wj)
]
. (26)
A few interesting results are obtained from (22). Which can be written :
pi =
1− α
1 + α
m+
α
1 + α
[(
1 +
1 + α
2 (α + δ (1− α))
)
wi +
(
1− 1 + α
2 (α + δ (1− α))
)
wj
]
,
pj =
1− α
1 + α
m+
α
1 + α
[(
1− 1 + α
2 (α + δ (1− α))
)
wi +
(
1 +
1 + α
2 (α + δ (1− α))
)
wj
]
.(27)
Relations (27) shows that an increase in both wages and money supply increases
the domestic production price when both money and commodity markets are
cleared. The analysis of the foreign production price follows by symmetry. There
are two effects playing here. The first is a monetary mechanism effect and the
second is a trade balance effect. First, from (26) an increase in wi increases the
production. From (21), the monetary equilibrium is reached only if prices go up.
Second, from (23) an increase in wi involves a trade balance surplus due to a less-
ening of the domestic production.
4 The effects of unions’ coordination
The objective of this Section is to determine which of the two regimes (uncoordi-
nated and coordinated of unions) leads to higher wages in the monetary union.
Let us assume that `0i = `0j = ˜`. Economic values in a coordinated regime are
indexed by c, while economic values in a uncoordinated regime are indexed by
nc. Replacing `0i and `0j by ˜` in (14) and in (17), we obtain:
wci = wcj = m− (1 + α) ˜`+
b
2
(1 + α) (1− α) ,
wnci = wncj = m− (1 + α)˜`+
b
2
(1 + α)
[
(1− α) + 2βα(1 + α)
σ
]
. (28)
Externalities of unions’ behavior can be internalized in a coordinated wage set-
ting. Indeed wages and prices are low: wci < wnci and wcj < wncj.Money supplies
are given by:
mc = 2α ˜`+
b(1− 2λα(1− α))
2λ
,
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mnc = 2α ˜`+
b(1− 2λα(1− α))
2λ
[
1 +
2βα(1 + α)
σ(1− α)
]
. (29)
Depending on the degree of conservatism of the central banker, it is possible to
compare the two money supplies:
mc > mnc if λ >
1
2 (1− α)α and mc < mnc if λ <
1
2 (1− α)α.
When trade unions are coordinated, wage moderation is not a sufficient condi-
tion to ensure a more flexible monetary policy. This is only the case if the central
banker is very conservative. Production prices are higher in a uncoordinated sit-
uation: pc < pnc. Labour demand is higher when unions are coordinated, `c > `nc,
which involves yc > ync. Consumer price and real wages are lower in a coordi-
nated regime: qc < qnc, wc < wnc.
The unions’ interest is to coordinate their decisions in order to maximize em-
ployment in the monetary union. These results are independent of the central
banker’s behavior.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a Stackelberg game between the Central Banker of a mon-
etary union and two countries which differ in their consumer price index. This
leads all prices to differ across countries. In each country, the labor market is
characterized by the presence of a single union, who acts as a monopoly of labor
supply. Firms take the already set wage which maximizes the union workers’
welfare. The paper highlighted the effects of internationally coordinated unions
versus internationally uncoordinated unions. It has been shown that international
coordination between unions in a monetary union yields to lower wages and a
higher employment level compared with uncoordinated unions. The main lesson
of this paper is that internationally coordinated unions leads to an accommodat-
ing monetary policy. There is more money circulating in the economy as long as
the Central Banker is sufficiently conservative in terms of inflation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Approximation
Since subscripts i and j do not play any role here, we omit them in this appendix.
Let us recall (2):
Lα−1 =
W
αP
.
Let us use a linear approximation of the previous expression in a neigbourghood
of L0:
(α− 1)Lα−20
[
L− L0
L0
]
L0 =
1
P0α
[
W −W0
W0
]
W0 − W0
αP 20
[
P − P0
P0
]
P0. (30)
Let us denote by small letters the following quantities:
` =
L− L0
L0
, w =
W −W0
W0
p =
P − P0
P0
.
Rewrite (30) with these notations, developp the left hand side and use (2) into the
right hand side to get :
(α− 1)Lα−10 ` = Lα−10 w − Lα−10 p.
Simplify by Lα−10
(α− 1)` = w − p ⇐⇒ ` = −
[
w − p
1− α
]
⇐⇒ L = L0
1−
 WW0 − PP0
1− α
 .
Consequently, L > 0 =⇒ W
W0
− P
P0
< 1 − α. The difference between the wage
increase W/W0 and the price increase P/P0 captures the increase in the real pur-
chasing power of consumers.
A.2 Minimization of the unions’ loss function
The first program (3) is solved as follow :
max
wi
Ui = −(`i − `0i)2 + bwci,
s.c.∂wj
∂wi
= ∂m
∂wi
= 0.
Using (14), (24) and (25), we derive :
Ui = −
[
− (1− α)−1 (wi − pi)− `0i
]2
+ bwci,
Ui = −
[
1
1+α
m− 1
1−α
[
wi − α2(α+δ(1−α)) (wi − wj)− α1+α (wi + wj)
]
− `0i
]2
+b
[
wi − 1−α1+αm− α1+α(wi + wj)− (1− 2β) α2(α+δ(1−α))(wi − wj)
]
.
The first order condition is:
∂Ui
∂wi
= −2
[
− 1
1−α
[
1− α
2(α+δ(1−α)) − α1+α
]]
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[
1
1+α
m− 1
1−α
[
wi − α2(α+δ(1−α)) (wi − wj)− α1+α (wi + wj)
]
− `0i
]
+b
[
1− α
1+α
− (1− 2β) α
2(α+δ(1−α))
]
= 0,
σ, η, θ and τ , are defined as follow:
σ = α + 2δ, η = bτ
2σ2
[(1− α)σ + 2βα(1 + α)] ,
θ = α(1− 2δ), τ = 2(1 + α)(α + δ(1− α)).
The we have :
wi = m+
θ
σ
(m− wj)− τσ `0i + η,
wj = m+
θ
σ
(m− wi)− τσ `0j + η.
Resolution of program (5) is similar except that the maximisation must be done
simultaneously in reference with wi and wj .
A.3 Minimization of the Central Banker’s loss function
Program (22) is also based on the derivation of the utility function :
max
wi
Ψ = Vi + Vj =
[
− (`i − `0i)2 − λq2
]
+
[
− (`j − `0i)2 − λq2j
]
sc. ∂wi
∂m
= ∂wj
∂m
= 0,
with
Ψ = −
(
1
1+α
m− 1
1−α
[
wi − α2(α+δ(1−α)) (wi − wj)− α1+α (wi + wj)
]
− `0i
)2
−λ
(
1−α
1+α
m+ α
1+α
(wi + wj) + (1− 2β) α2(α+δ(1−α))(wi − wj)
)2
−
(
1
1+α
m− 1
1−α
[
wj +
α
2(α+δ(1−α)) (wi − wj)− α1+α (wi + wj)
]
− `0j
)2
−λ
(
1−α
1+α
m+ α
1+α
(wi + wj)− (1− 2β) α2(α+δ(1−α))(wi − wj)
)2
.
The first order condition is:
∂Ψ
∂m
= 0
⇐⇒
[
2 (1 + 2λ (1− α))
1 + α
]
m+
[
2α− (1 + α) + (2λα (1− α))
(1− α)(1 + α)
]
(wi + wj)−(`0i+`0j) = 0.
The solution is
m = 1−2λ(1−α)α
2+2λ(1−α)2 (wi + wj) +
1+α
2+2λ(1−α)2 (`0i + `0j).
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